Abstract
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become embedded in high-stakes environments, security assessment must account for both the vulnerabilities of individual models and the dependencies through which their effects may influence a larger system. A central challenge is to connect these analyses with mitigation decisions while preserving the conditions and evidence that support each conclusion. This paper proposes a formal, lifecycle-aware security-testing framework that brings model-centric and system-centric analysis into a common assessment process. Within a finite scope, it relates threats to their data and deployment contexts, assesses mitigation outcomes using metric-specific criteria, and separates individual-defense evaluation from defense selection. To preserve the basis of these decisions, linked records associate findings with their source conditions and with any assumptions used in subsequent interpretation. A supporting reporting specification organizes this evidence for engineering and organizational review. Selected elements of the method are illustrated through reported digital-patch outcomes and dependency calculations in a perception example, with empirical observations distinguished from analytical assumptions.




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Data Availability
This study uses the publicly available COCO 2017 dataset. The experimental data generated in this study, including evaluation results, are not publicly deposited but are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
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Hassan Chaitou contributed primarily to Sections 3 and 4. Njaka-Harilala Andriamandratomanana contributed primarily to Section 5. All authors contributed to the other sections of the manuscript, reviewed the full paper, and approved the final version.
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Chaitou, H., Andriamandratomanana, NH. & Rais, H. A dual-layer security framework for AI systems: a lifecycle-aware security testing approach. World Wide Web 29, 50 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11280-026-01437-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11280-026-01437-4