Summary
In affected versions, the SDK's OAuth client let the MCP server decide which authorization server received the client's OAuth credentials. Credentials were not tied to the authorization server they belong to.
A malicious or compromised MCP server could name its own authorization server. With no user interaction, the client would send it:
- the
refresh_token and client_secret stored from an earlier sign-in
- the
client_secret or signed assertion configured on a bundled provider
Am I affected?
Yes, if both of these hold:
- your application uses the SDK's OAuth client over HTTP, through any of:
- an
authProvider on a transport
- the
withOAuth() middleware
- direct calls to
auth() or fetchToken()
- it may connect to an MCP server you do not fully trust while holding credentials for a legitimate authorization server
Affected versions:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.12.0 through 1.30.1
@modelcontextprotocol/client 2.0.0 through 2.1.0, only for:
- bundled providers without
expectedIssuer
- credentials stored or supplied without
issuer
- direct calls to
fetchToken()
- providers that read storage back through
OAuthTokensSchema or OAuthClientInformationSchema
Not affected:
- MCP servers built with the SDK
- stdio clients
Fix
Upgrade to:
- 1.x:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.31.0 or later
- 2.x:
@modelcontextprotocol/client 2.2.0 or later, and @modelcontextprotocol/core 2.2.0 or later if you import it directly
The client now records the authorization server as issuer on saved credentials and does not send them to a different one. The user signs in again, or the call throws.
In the following cases, upgrading to the patched version is not enough. You also need to make a change:
- Bundled providers (
ClientCredentialsProvider, PrivateKeyJwtProvider, StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider, CrossAppAccessProvider): pass expectedIssuer, for example expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'. Without it they still use whichever authorization server the MCP server names.
- Credentials saved without
issuer: tokens and client information your OAuthClientProvider persisted (file, keychain, database) before upgrading, including everything 1.x saved before 1.31.0. They still go to whichever authorization server is named at first use. Add issuer to them, or clear them so users sign in again.
- Your own
OAuthClientProvider: save exactly what saveTokens() and saveClientInformation() are given, including issuer. For pre-registered credentials, include issuer in what clientInformation() returns.
Not covered by this fix:
- a new interactive sign-in, which still goes to the authorization server the MCP server names. Only complete sign-ins for servers you trust.
refreshAuthorization() and exchangeAuthorization() called directly
- 2.x with
skipIssuerMetadataValidation: true
If an affected client may have connected to an untrusted MCP server, rotate its client secret or signing key and revoke its tokens.
If you cannot upgrade yet, connect OAuth clients only to MCP servers you trust. 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 already accept expectedIssuer.
References
Summary
In affected versions, the SDK's OAuth client let the MCP server decide which authorization server received the client's OAuth credentials. Credentials were not tied to the authorization server they belong to.
A malicious or compromised MCP server could name its own authorization server. With no user interaction, the client would send it:
refresh_tokenandclient_secretstored from an earlier sign-inclient_secretor signed assertion configured on a bundled providerAm I affected?
Yes, if both of these hold:
authProvideron a transportwithOAuth()middlewareauth()orfetchToken()Affected versions:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk1.12.0 through 1.30.1@modelcontextprotocol/client2.0.0 through 2.1.0, only for:expectedIssuerissuerfetchToken()OAuthTokensSchemaorOAuthClientInformationSchemaNot affected:
Fix
Upgrade to:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk1.31.0 or later@modelcontextprotocol/client2.2.0 or later, and@modelcontextprotocol/core2.2.0 or later if you import it directlyThe client now records the authorization server as
issueron saved credentials and does not send them to a different one. The user signs in again, or the call throws.In the following cases, upgrading to the patched version is not enough. You also need to make a change:
ClientCredentialsProvider,PrivateKeyJwtProvider,StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider,CrossAppAccessProvider): passexpectedIssuer, for exampleexpectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'. Without it they still use whichever authorization server the MCP server names.issuer: tokens and client information yourOAuthClientProviderpersisted (file, keychain, database) before upgrading, including everything 1.x saved before 1.31.0. They still go to whichever authorization server is named at first use. Addissuerto them, or clear them so users sign in again.OAuthClientProvider: save exactly whatsaveTokens()andsaveClientInformation()are given, includingissuer. For pre-registered credentials, includeissuerin whatclientInformation()returns.Not covered by this fix:
refreshAuthorization()andexchangeAuthorization()called directlyskipIssuerMetadataValidation: trueIf an affected client may have connected to an untrusted MCP server, rotate its client secret or signing key and revoke its tokens.
If you cannot upgrade yet, connect OAuth clients only to MCP servers you trust. 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 already accept
expectedIssuer.References